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TWO CONTRASTING APPROACHES IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF OUTDATED STATUTORY PROVISIONS
WX v. WW'
AAG v. Estate ofAAH, deceased 2
GOH YIHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some statutes in operation today were passed a long time ago. Inevitably, through
the passage of time, social norms at the time of enactment may now be unrecognis-
able. The legislative intent at the time of enactment may also seem outdated in more
modem times. Judges interpreting specific provisions of these statutes may therefore
encounter problems in ensuring a 'just' result in an instant case. Two recent cases
show contrasting approaches towards the interpretation of outdated statutory provi-
sions. The first approach is seen in the Singapore High Court case of WX v. WW. That
case concerned the interpretation of section 114 of the Evidence Act,3 a decidedly
ancient statutory provision. In its desire to achieve what it considered a just and com-
monsensical result,4 the court adopted an interpretation that arguably departed from
the original legislative intent, but reached the 'correct' result. The second approach
was adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AAG v. Estate ofAAH, deceased. In
that case, the Court of Appeal had to interpret sections 2 and 3(1) of the Inheritance
(Family Provision)Act,5 which was enacted some 45 years ago.6 The Court of Appeal
disregarded social developments since the enactment of the IFPA and decided that
the original legislative intent present at the time of enactment was determinative
of the correct interpretation of the provisions concerned. However, the result was
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. I am grateful for the very helpful comments and
suggestions given to me by my colleague Leong Wai Kum on an earlier version of this piece. I would
also like to thank the referee for his or her helpful suggestions. All errors, however, remain my own.
WX v. WW [2009] 3 S.L.R. 573 (H.C.) [WX1.
2 AAG v. Estate ofAAH, deceased [2010] 1 S.L.R. 769 (C.A.) [AAG].
3 Evidence Act (Cap. 97, 1997 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [EA].
4 WX, supra note I at para. 6.
5 Inheritance (Family Pmvision) Act (Cap. 138, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [IFPA].
6 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 25, col. 77 at 78 (21 April 1966) (Mr. Yong Nyuk Lin).
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'regretfully' reached.7 Between a correct and commonsensical result and a result
regretfully reached lies the difficulty of balancing present justice, future consistency
and avoiding complications in other areas of law generated by an outdated statutory
provision. This note attempts to provide some views on how these concerns are best
balanced.
II. WX V. WW
A. The Facts and Decision
WX was an appeal heard by the High Court against the decision of the District
Court. The District Court had decided that the appellant was liable to pay maintenance
for the respondent's daughter8 pursuant to section 69(2) of the Women's Charter.9
The main issue before both courts was whether the appellant was the father of the
child, which in turn was relevant in determining whether the appellant ought to pay
maintenance for the child. According to the respondent, she had sexual relationships
with two men between 2001 and May 2005, one of whom was the appellant. In June
2005, the respondent discovered that she was pregnant. The other man-referred to
by the courts as "H"-thought that the child was his and married the respondent. The
child was born in January 2006. However, it became apparent to H that the child could
not be his biological daughter owing to her blood group. H then had a DNA test done
and scientifically confirmed that he was not the biological father of the child. H
commenced nullity proceedings that eventually resulted in the nullification of his
marriage with the respondent. 10 The respondent thereafter claimed for maintenance
for the child against the appellant. The respondent succeeded before the District
Court. The court believed the respondent that she only ever had sexual relations with
the appellant and H. Since the DNA test report showed that H was not the child's
father, the court concluded that the appellant must be the father of the child." The
appellant appealed to the High Court.
B. Proceedings before the High Court
Before the High Court, the appellant argued that section 114 of the EA raised a
conclusive presumption that the child is the legitimate daughter of H since she was
born when the marriage between the respondent and H was still subsisting. In this
respect, section 114 of the EA provides as follows:
Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy
114. The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage
between his mother and any man, or within 280 days after its dissolution, the
mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate
7 AAG, supra note 2 at para. 44.
8 For convenience, she will be referred to as "the child" unless otherwise stated.
9 The Women's Charter (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [the Charter].
10 Presumably under section 106(e) of the Charter.
11 WW v. WX [2008] SGDC 93 at paras. 8 and 13.
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son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no
access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.
As such, the appellant argued that he could not be the child's father and was not
liable to pay maintenance, notwithstanding the DNA test report which showed that
H was not the biological father of the child. Faced with the DNA test report, the
court understandably thought that the appellant's argument "offend[ed] both justice
and commonsense" 1 2 and that upholding the appellant's position would mean that
"the law would hold that H is the father of the child even though the science has
shown otherwise".1 3 The court therefore found the appellant to be the biological
father of the child and upheld the lower court's decision ordering him to maintain
the child. This is an eminently reasonable decision. Indeed, a reasonable layperson
would most definitely agree with the court's sense of justice and fairness. However,
it may be of value to examine the court's reasoning a bit more closely. After an
examination of the historical origins of section 114 of the EA, 14 the court decided
that section 114 of the EA was concerned only with the issue of legitimacy and not
paternity.' 5 The court gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, section 114 of
the EA does not expressly provide for a presumption of paternity in the same way it
provides for a presumption of legitimacy. 16 Secondly, the presumption of legitimacy
in section 114 of the EA arises even in circumstances where "some person other than
the husband is likely to be the biological father".17 Since section 114 of the EA was
concerned with the issue of legitimacy and the protection of a child as such, the
court thought that it would be wrong to interpret section 114 to deny protection to
a child in terms of maintenance due to him or her by the biological father. 18 For
these reasons, the court concluded that section 114 of the EA only concerned the
conferment of legitimacy "in the circumstances set out in the provision and not to
rebut or invalidate evidence that a man is the biological father of a child". 19
As a secondary ground for its decision, the court pointed out that sections 68 and
69 of the Charter establish a legal duty on the part of the parent to contribute to the
maintenance of his children whether they are his legitimate children or not. 20 This
meant that because the DNA test report showed the appellant to be the biological
father of the child, he was liable for her maintenance under those provisions. Whether
the child was the appellant's legitimate or illegitimate child did not matter. While the
court said that this conclusion was independent of its interpretation of section 114 of
12 WX, supra note 1 at para. 6.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. at paras. 7-9.
15 Ibid. at para. 11. See also AAE v. AAF [2009] 3 S.L.R. 827 (H.C.) [AAE v. AAFJ at para. 25, where the
High Court understood the court in WX to have "reasoned that the presumption of legitimacy in s. 114
[of the EA] is confined to the status of the child alone; paternity of itself-whether the child is an issue
of the husband-is a different matter and falls outside the provision". Interestingly, she noted that "[tihe
distinction was made to get around the evidential restriction in s. 114 [of the EA]" (emphasis added).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. at para. 12 (emphasis added). An example of such a circumstance would be when the mother remarries
after the dissolution of her first marriage and her child is born shortly into her second marriage. In this
case, the child would be presumed to be the legitimate child of the mother's second husband.
18 Ibid. at para. 14.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. at para. 15.
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the EA, 21 it is respectfully submitted that this is not the case. A step in the reasoning
must be that paternity can be separated from legitimacy in section 114 of the EA. If
not, the presumption that the child is the legitimate daughter of H (which the court
did not discount) raises the corresponding presumption that H is the biological father
of the child, in which case there would be no paternity relationship between the
appellant and the child in law, notwithstanding the scientific conclusion reached in
the DNA test report. 22
Finally, the court opined that it was 'difficult' to see how Parliament, in enacting
sections 68 and 69 of the Charter more than half a century after section 114 of the
EA was enacted, could have intended to relieve the duty to provide maintenance
under the Charter vis-a-vis the biological father when the mother happened to be
married to another man at the time of birth. 23 Again, while the court did not say so,
this is actually a third reason in support of its reading of section 114 of the EA: it
must be possible to separate the issue of paternity from that of legitimacy in section
114 of the EA because failure to do so would mean the unacceptable consequence
that the scientifically proven biological father has no duty to maintain a child who
was born during the mother's valid marriage to another man. 24 The desirability of
this consequence derives an interpretation of section 114 of the EA that separates
paternity from legitimacy.
III. AAG v. ESTATE OF AAH, DECEASED
A. The Facts and Decision
AAG likewise concerned the interpretation of a relatively old statutory provision,
enacted just a year after Singapore's independence. In this case, the appellant sought,
on behalf of her two illegitimate daughters, maintenance from the estate of the
deceased, the respondent, under the IFPA. The High Court had dismissed her appli-
cation. On appeal, the sole issue was whether an illegitimate child could claim for
support under the IFPA.
B. Proceedings before the Court ofAppeal
The relevant provisions were section 3(1) read with section 2 of the IFPA. Section
3(1) allows, amongst others, a wife to apply for maintenance for certain dependants,
including a son and daughter.25 Section 2 of the IFPA defines "son" and "daughter"
for the purposes of the IFPA but does not expressly exclude an illegitimate child from
claiming maintenance under the IFPA. Notwithstanding this, the Court of Appeal
unanimously dismissed the appeal and held that the respondent need not provide any
21 Ibid. "Even if I were wrong in my interpretation of the scope of s. 114 of the [EA], I would hold that it
does not apply in respect of s. 69(2) of the Charter....
22 The starting point is section 114 of the EA, not section 68 of the Charter. In other words, a legal conclusion
that the appellant is the biological father of the child cannot be reached without interpreting section 114
of the EA.
23 WY, supra note I at para. 17.
24 The child would be presumed to be the legitimate child of that man under section 114 of the EA.
25 Sections 3(l)(b), (c) and (d) of the IFPA.
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maintenance for the appellant's daughters. The court emphasised that the IFPA was
enacted to introduce into Singapore the provisions of the U.K. Inheritance (Family
Provision) Act 1938.26 The established interpretation of the IFPA (U.K.) by the
English courts was that illegitimate children were not entitled to maintenance under
it. This interpretation was relevant because, during the Second Reading of the IFPA
(in its Bill form) in the Singapore Parliament, the sponsoring Minister had said that
"[t]he provisions relating to family provision appear to have worked well in England
and it is proposed to introduce them into Singapore". 27 That was legislative intention
and the court held that it was obliged to give effect to such intention. 28
In reaching this decision, the court was alive to the potential disruption to other
areas of law had a contrary interpretation been reached. In particular, the court thought
that to permit an illegitimate child to claim for maintenance against his or her deceased
parent's estate would be to indirectly allow that child to claim for a share in the
intestate parent's estate,29 contrary to the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act.30
In the end, the court urged Parliament to seriously consider making the necessary
reforms to enable an illegitimate child to claim for maintenance under the IFPA.
IV. RETHINKING WX v. WW
Before we discuss which of the two interpretive approaches is preferable, a more
immediate problem needs to be addressed. This concerns the reasoning of the High
Court in WX. It is indisputable that the High Court took considerable effort to avoid the
unfairness which section 114 of the EA would have caused if applied in WX. Its effort
to judicially avoid the undesirable consequences of section 114 of the EA rested on a
single premise: it is possible to separate the issue of paternity from that of legitimacy
in section 114 of the EA. It is only because of this possibility that the scientific proof of
the appellant's paternity (i.e., the DNA test report) could be considered by the court. It
is respectfully submitted that this conclusion should be reconsidered. Section 114 of
the EA presumes both legitimacy and paternity and provides that the only manner
of rebutting this presumption is by way of 'no access'. As such, the DNA test report
would be of no relevance because it does not go towards showing 'no access'.
A. The True Nature of the Presumption in Section 114 of the EA
1. The presumption of legitimacy is premised upon an implicit presumption
of paternity
The reason for the presumption of legitimacy is that of possibility of 'access'
between husband and wife. In section 114 of the EA, legitimacy is presumed
because there is a valid marriage between the mother and her husband. The fur-
ther basis of this presumption is that because there is a valid marriage, there
26 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 (U.K.), 1938, c. 45 [IFPA (U.K.)].
27 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 25, col. 77 at 78 (21 April 1966) (Mr. Yong Nyuk Lin).
28 WX, supra note I at para. 40.
29 Ibid. at para. 38.
30 Cap. 146, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.
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would be opportunities for the child to have been conceived by both parties dur-
ing the marriage. The child is a child of the marriage and legitimate. Therefore,
implicit in that is also the presumption of paternity, i.e., that the child is both the
legitimate and biological child of the husband. 'No access' does not defeat legiti-
macy on its own; it defeats legitimacy because it shows there was no opportunity
for the child to have been conceived, such that the child is not the biologi-
cal offspring of the father. This means that the child is also not the legitimate
child.31
It is also not desirable to separate the concept of paternity from legitimacy save
for one limited circumstance. 32 Whereas paternity is a biological fact, legitimacy is
a legal status which has to build upon paternity. If legitimacy is a status without a
criterion of conferment, then it becomes very difficult to ascertain when a child is
legitimate. The common denominator should always be paternity, whether presumed
or real.33 One cannot be the legitimate child of one man but the biological child
of another man. It is only through a court order of adoption that the law confers
legitimacy upon the relationship between the child and the adoptive parents regardless
of paternity. 34
Moreover, the judicial and academic characterisation of the presumption under
section 114 of the EA has been one of 'paternity'. For example, in AD v. AE, 35
the Singapore High Court characterised section 114 as "a provision that presumes
paternity". 36 Elsewhere, it has been stated that the rationale of section 112 of the
Indian Evidence Act37 (which is identical to section 114 of the EA) seems to be that
it is undesirable to enquire into the paternity of a child whose parents have access
to each other.38 The underlying premise, as already submitted, is the presumption
31 In fact, even the definition of "legitimacy" cited by the High Court in WX admits of the logical nexus
between patemity and legitimacy:
Legitimacy is a status: it is the condition of belonging to a class in society the members of which are
regarded as having been begotten in lawful matrimony by men whom the law regards as their fathers
(emphasis added).
See WX, supra note I at para. 11, citing David Hay, ed., Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 4th
ed. (London: LexisNexis, 2007) 38.
32 This concerns adoption which is inapplicable to the facts of WX.
3 In section 114 of the EA, the line between a presumption and fact is at a vanishing point because it is
difficult to rebut the presumption with the legal consequence that it is regarded as legally factual. Thus,
legitimacy and paternity cannot be separated for reasons of logic. One can only be a legitimate and
biological child of another (bom within wedlock) and an illegitimate but biological child of another (born
out of wedlock).
3 It is not clear whether parents may be allowed to circumvent the status of illegitimacy of their relationship
with their child by adopting their own child: see Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore,
Ist ed. (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2007) 402-403. In this regard we need to note that adoption confers
legitimacy on the relationship by a separate route altogether from the norm that builds upon biological
parenthood.
35 AD v. AE (minors: custody, care, control and access) [200512 S.L.R. 180 (H.C.) [AD v. AE].
36 Ibid. at para. 8. The learned judge also spoke of the "s. 114 presumption of paternity" in the same
paragraph.
37 Indian Evidence Act 1872, No. I of 1872 [Indian Evidence Act].
38 See Palani v. Sethu A.I.R. 1924 Mad 677; see also Palsingh v. Jagir A.I.R. 1926 Lah 529(2). See also
Ratanlal Ranchhoddas & Dhirajlal Keshavlal Thakore, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Law ofEvidence, 22nd
ed. (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, 2006) [Ranchhoddas & Thakore] 1173.
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of paternity.39 It is therefore submitted that section 114 of the EA should not be
interpreted in a manner which would separate paternity from legitimacy. The pre-
sumption of legitimacy presupposes paternity, and so a presumption of paternity
likewise arises from section 114 of the EA if its requirements are met. Obviously,
the perceived need to interpret otherwise on the facts of WX in order to do justice is
keenly appreciated. However, it may be necessary to accept this outdated evidential
rule. The legitimate room for manouevering around its problems is unfortunately
rather small.
2. The irrelevance offactual artificiality arising from Section 114 of the EA
The High Court in WX made the further (and logical) point that the presumption of
legitimacy in section 114 of the EA arises even in circumstances where some person
other than the husband is likely to be the biological father. Accordingly, the court felt
that the conferment of legitimacy is a matter of policy rather than biological real-
ity, and can be safely ignored when biological reality plausibly shows otherwise.40
However, does the likelihood of a likely plausibility exclude the application of the
presumption in section 114 of the EA? It is suggested that it does not. The entire
basis for a presumption is to shut out the possibility of such likelihood and make
a presumption one way or the other. If the manner of rebuttal does not allow for
the scientific evidence to be adduced, then there is in law no other likelihood, espe-
cially if the presumption is a conclusive one, as section 114 of the EA is. In fact,
the paradigm situation where the presumption in section 114 of the EA is challenged
raises precisely the likelihood of an equally plausible alternative explanation as to
the paternity of the child. In many cases, the mother would have been in an intimate
relationship with A before marrying B, a short time after which her child is born. The
question inevitably is whether the child should be presumed as B's legitimate (and
biological) child even though it seems equally (and sometimes more) plausible that
A is the biological father. In the absence of proof of 'no access' between the mother
and B, the courts have inevitably stayed true to the language of section 114 of the
EA41 to hold the child to be the legitimate and biological child of B. Thus in Pon-
nuswamy Reddiar v. Vasantha,42 the woman left her husband ten days after marriage
and lived with the appellant. Seven months later, her child was born. The appellant
was not presumed to be the father of the child. Likewise, in the absence of proof
of non-access, even though the wife was living apart from her husband and leading
an unchaste life, her child would still be deemed to be the legitimate and biological
child of her validly married husband. 43 These examples reinforce the point that the
3 Likewise, Associate Professor Debbie Ong has also written that:
The effect of [section 114 of the EA] is not only to protect the child's legitimate status, it also creates
an almost irrebuttable presumption of paternity since it establishes that the child is "the son of that
man".
See Debbie Ong, "Proof of Paternity and Access to Non-Biological Child" (2003) 15 Sing. Ac. L.J. 399
at para. 3. See also Leong Wai Kum, "Legal Implications of Paternity Testing" in Terry Kaan & Edison
T. Liu, eds., Life Sciences: Law and Ethics-Recent Developments in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore
Academy of Law and Bioethics Advisory Committee, 2006) 162-170.
4 WX, supra note I at para. 12 (emphasis added).
41 Or its equivalents elsewhere.
42 (1967) 1 M.L.J. 102 (High Court of Judicature at Madras).
43 Krishnappa v. Venkatappa A.I.R. 1943 Mad 632.
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likelihood of an alternative explanation" cannot rebut the presumption in section
114 of the EA.
3. The effect of parliament's non-updating of Section 114 of the EA
Undoubtedly, section 114 of the EA is urgently in need of reform. But can legislative
reform of a related provision lead to the inference that section 114 of the EA has
likewise been updated? The High Court in WX, in contrast with the Court of Appeal
inAAG, thought that this was possible. The High Court reasoned that Parliament could
not have intended to relieve the duty to provide maintenance under the Charter vis-
a-vis the biological father when the mother happened to be married to another man
at the time of birth. This is especially since Parliament enacted sections 68 and 69
of the Charter after section 114 of the EA had been enacted.4 5
While the High Court's implicit statement that section 114 of the EA is long over-
due for updating is readily shared, is it possible to say one statute has been updated
by the reform of another? Where this is expressly provided for, it is obviously possi-
ble. But difficulties arise where the implication is indirect or vague. Thus, while the
court is absolutely right to say that sections 68 and 69 of the Charter were enacted
after the enactment of section 114 of the EA, this may not be the most accurate way
of ascertaining the legislative intention vis-a-vis section 114. It is anyone's guess
what Parliament intended with respect to section 114 of the EA when that provision
was likely never in its contemplation when the Charter was debated and passed into
law. The better position may be that of the Court of Appeal in AAG, which is to adopt a
restrictive reading of the effect which the enactment of one statutory provision has on
another.46 That approach has relevance in WX. Although the last direct amendment
of the EA was undertaken in 2003 with the passage of the Evidence (Amendment) Act
2003,47 it is difficult to say that Parliament intended for the presumption in section
114 of the EA to 'apply over' sections 68 and 69 of the Charter since it amended
the EA without amending section 114 after enacting sections 68 and 69 of the
Charter.
B. How Preserving Section 114 of the EA Maintains a Child's Right to
Maintenance
There is a further concern. If, as suggested, section 114 of the EA is interpreted to
presume both legitimacy and paternity, does that reduce the irrelevance of legitimacy
in section 68 of the Charter? This is a possibility since it might be argued that if
section 114 of the EA presumes (almost conclusively) that the legitimate child of a
man must also be his biological child, there is no purpose left for the reference to
" Except for 'no access'.
45 WX, supra note 1 at para. 17.
46 AAG, supra note 2 at para. 27.
47 No. 17 of 2003. Indeed, indirect amendments to the EA were effected as recently as 2007 with the Penal
Code (Amendment) Act 2007 (No. 51 of 2007).
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illegitimacy in section 68 of the Charter.48 To deal with this concern, it is important
to realise that section 114 of the EA applies only when the child is born during a
valid marriage or within 280 days after the dissolution of such marriage provided
the mother does not remarry in that time. Thus, a child can still be the illegitimate
but biological issue of a man or woman if the couple is not validly married. The
reference to 'illegitimacy' under section 68 of the Charter protects children in such a
situation. As for a child who is (almost) conclusively presumed to be the legitimate
child of a man who has been scientifically shown not to be his biological father, it is
submitted that section 114 of the EA does no harm to the purpose behind section 68 of
the Charter. The primary purpose of section 68 of the Charter is to ensure that there
is someone to maintain the child. As far as possible, it tries to find the 'right' person
to lay this responsibility upon, but it is largely neutral as to the conclusiveness of this
criterion. This is why section 68 of the Charter is not concerned with the custody
or legitimacy of the child vis-i-vis the parent. Interpreting section 114 of the EA
read with section 68 of the Charter as pinning the responsibility of maintenance on
the scientifically proved non-biological father of the child still protects the child's
right to maintenance. It may not seem 'right' for the scientifically proved biological
father to escape his responsibility, but in law this person is not the father of the child
unless the presumption in section 114 of the EA can be rebutted. In some cases, the
scientifically proved non-biological father may not leave the marriage as H has in
WX; section 114 of the EA in fact reinforces the child's right to maintenance from
someone who is his or her 'substantive father' in this scenario.
C. The Impermissibility of Considering DNA Evidence
If it is accepted that the presumption of legitimacy in section 114 of the EA also
raises a presumption of paternity, it must then be considered whether it was correct
to admit the DNA test report in WX to, in effect, rebut this presumption of pater-
nity. According to section 114 of the EA, proof of 'no access' is the only prescribed
manner to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. In the District Court decision of
MB v. MC,49 the court, following academic materials, 50 stated that 'no access' has
two meanings. First, it means the physical separation of the parties at the possi-
ble time of the child's conception. Secondly, it also means the absence of sexual
contact between the mother and her husband during the time in which the child was
conceived. 51
48 For convenience, section 68 of the Charter provides as follows:
Duty of parents to maintain children
68. Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to
maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody
or the custody of any other person, and whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, either by providing
them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to
his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof.
49 [2005] SGDC 181 [MB v. MC].
So See Leong Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997) 604
and Ratanlal Ranchhoddas & Dhirajlal Keshavlal Thakore, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Law of Evidence,
21st ed. (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, 2004) 951, 955 and 956.
51 See also the Indian decisions of Krishnappa v. Venkatappa A.I.R. 1943 Mad 632; Hanumantha Rao
v. Ramachandrayya A.I.R. 1944 Mad 376 and Vira Reddy v. Kistamma A.I.R. 1969 Mad 235. See further
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The preponderance of legal opinion is that DNA evidence is not proof of 'no
access'.52 Indian decisions quite explicitly dismiss the possibility of DNA evidence
being admissible to rebut the presumption of legitimacy raised by section 112 of the
Indian Evidence Act. For example, in the Indian Supreme Court case of Smt Kamti
Devi and Anr v. Poshi Ram,53 it was held that:54
We may remember that Section 112 of the [Indian] Evidence Act was enacted
at a time when the modern scientific advancements with Dioxy Nucleic Acid
(DNA) as well as Ribonucleic Acid (UNA) tests were not even in contemplation
of the legislature. The result of a genuine DNA test is said to be scientifically
accurate. But even that is not enough to escape from the collusiveness of Section
112 of the [Indian Evidence] Act, e.g., if a husband and wife were living together
during the time ofconception but the DNA test revealed that the child was not born
to the husband, the conclusiveness in law would remain unrebuttable. This may
look hard from the point of view of the husband who would be compelled to bear
the fatherhood of a child of which he may be innocent. But even in such a case the
law leans in favour of the innocent child from being bastardized if his mother and
her spouse were living together during the time of conception. Hence the question
regarding the degree of proof of non-access for rebutting the conclusiveness must
be answered in the light of what is meant by access or non-access as delineated
above.
Similarly, when referring to the permissibility of blood tests to determine paternity
in the shadow of section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Calcutta High Court
said in Tushar Roy v. Sukla Roy:55
Section 112 [of the Indian Evidence Act] is clear enough that once the husband is
shown to have had access to the wife at any time when the conception could have
taken place, the scope of adducing rebuttal evidence becomes non-available. The
contending party cannot [be] permitted to say that he will rebut the conclusive
presumption of law regarding paternity by proving directly by blood test that
the husband is not the biological father of the child which will virtually be an
abrogation of the existing provision of Section 112.
Having regard to the Indian legal and social scenario I have no hesitation in
my mind that the time is not yet ripe for a meaningful judicial activism so as
to throw away over-board the judicial interpretation which Section 112 of the
[Indian] Evidence Act has consistently received so long and to take recourse to
any over-jealous interpretation by causing extreme violence to the language of
the said section so as to virtually abrogate the same. I therefore hold that neither
the language of Section 112 of the [Indian] Evidence Act nor the interpretation
the Singapore decisions of Ong Jane Rebecca v. Lim Lie Hoa (also known as Lim Le Hoa and Lily Arief
Husni) and Others [2003] SGHC 126 at para. 18 and Re Khoo Thean Tek's Settlements [1929] S.S.L.R. 50.
52 See MB v. MC, supra note 49 at para. 10 and AD v. AE, supra note 35 at para. 8.
SA.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2226.
" Ibid. at para. 11 (emphasis added). See also Shri Banarsi Dass v. Mrs Teeku Dutta (2005) 4 S.C.C. 449 at
para. 15. See further the discussion in Ranchhoddas & Thakore, supra note 38 at 1183-1185 and Sudipto
Sarkar & V.R. Manohar, Sarkar's Law of Evidence, 16th ed. (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, 2007)
1747-1748, although cf. 1764.
5 [1993] Cri. L.J. 1659 at paras. 4 and 15.
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it has consistently received throughout, nor even the consideration of welfare of
the children in disputed cases of paternity in general, demands or permits blood
test as exploratory or investigative experiment for determining paternity.
All of these authorities 56 suggest that it is impermissible for DNA evidence to be
used to rebut the presumption of legitimacy (and paternity) raised by section 114 of
the EA. Accordingly, in so far as the Singapore High Court in WX effectively used
the DNA test report to conclude that the appellant is the biological father of the child,
it is respectfully suggested that that conclusion might need to be reconsidered. And
for all the reasons discussed above, it is further suggested that it might be better to
leave section 114 of the EA as it has always been interpreted.
V. THE BETTER APPROACH: INTERPRETING AN OUTDATED PROVISION PURPOSIVELY
WITH REGARD TO ITS ORIGINAL INTENT
The High Court's interpretive approach in WX can be contrasted with the Court of
Appeal's approach in AAG. The approach in AAG focused primarily on the original
intent at the time of enactment of the statute. Such an approach meant that the Court
of Appeal was alive to the possibility of disruption caused to other areas of law
through an incorrect interpretation in one case. Indeed, WX can further be used to
illustrate how an outdated statutory provision (viz., section 114 of the EA) ostensibly
concerning a 'discrete' area of law (here, family law) can have unexpected effects
in other 'overarching' areas of law. In this respect then, the interpretive approach in
AAG is to be preferred to that in WX.
A. Ignoring a Conclusive Presumption of Law
The first ripple from WXconcerns evidential rules. InAAEv. AAF,5 7 when faced with a
similar DNA test report which showed that the husband was not the biological father
of the child concerned, the High Court stated that because both parties accepted
this scientific conclusion, there was no need to consider section 114 of the EA. 58
Therefore, although the child concerned was born some five months into a valid
marriage,59 the parties could agree (and the court could accept) that the child was
56 See also Ng Chian Perng (sued by her mother and next friend Wong Nyet Yoon) v. Ng Ho Peng [1998]
2 M.L.J. 686 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur). In that case, the appellant sued for maintenance of her child
from the respondent. She alleged that she had a sexual relationship with the respondent during the time
her child was conceived. However, she remained validly married to her husband whom she was separated
from because the husband had refused to sign the joint petition for divorce. The appellant's application
for maintenance was dismissed on appeal to the Kuala Lumpur High Court. It was held that section 112
of the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 (Act 56) (which is identical with section 114 of the EA) applied
to presume the child to be the legitimate child of the appellant's husband. The court also upheld the
magistrate's decision not to address the respondent's failure to undergo a DNA test; the implication must
be that the court regarded DNA testing to be an impermissible method of rebutting the presumption raised
by section 112 of the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950.
57 AAE v. AAF, supra note 15.
58 Ibid. at para. 25.
59 The parties were married on 22 February 1994 and the child was born on 25 July 1994: see ibid. at
paras. I and 25. This would have triggered the presumption of legitimacy and paternity in section 114 of
the EA.
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nonetheless not the legitimate and biological child of the husband. 60 While the issue
of the child's paternity in AAE v. AAF was not vital to the resolution of the case,6 1
this does suggest that it is possible for parties (and the court) to ignore presumptions
of law embodied in statutes.
1. Can the courts ignore a legal presumption?
It is respectfully submitted that courts cannot ignore legal presumptions statutorily
enshrined in the EA. As Professor Pinsler notes, in certain situations presumptions
are conclusive, in which case they are irrebuttable and must be applied by the court
without qualification. Even if there is a qualification, the court is required to apply
the presumption unless it is disproved.62 This is especially true when applied to
section 114 of the EA, which provides for a 'conclusive presumption'. Conclusive
proof is defined by section 4(3) of the EA as follows:
4.-(3) When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another,
the court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not
allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.
Because section 114 of the EA also contains a rebuttable part, section 4(2) of the EA
is also relevant:
4.-(2) Whenever it is directed by this Act that the court shall presume a fact, it
shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.
The use of the mandatory word "shall" in sections 4(2) and 4(3) of the EA means that
the court cannot ignore presumptions embodied in provisions of the EA, such as that
in section 114. Indeed, when Sir James Stephen wrote his introduction to the Indian
Evidence Act, he surmised that "[p]resumptions were inferences which the judges
were directed to draw from certain states of facts in certain cases". 63 In relation
to 'conclusive presumptions', he also wrote that while these are rare, when they
occur they provide that certain modes of proof shall not be liable to contradiction.
Likewise, when discussing the application of presumptions in the Misuse of Drugs
Act,65 the Court of Appeal in Tan Kiam Peng v. Public Prosecutor66 held that "the
courts must observe these considerations of policy enacted by the Legislature by
applying the law objectively to the facts at hand".67 All of these show that it is not
permissible for the courts to ignore presumptions of law raised in the EA if they are
not rebutted and especially if they are deemed to be 'conclusive'. Section 114 of the
6 AAE v. AAF, supra note 15 at para. 25: The wife "accepted the DNA report and its conclusion that
the [h]usband is not the [c]hild's biological father" and did not refute "the [h]usband's assertion in his
affidavit that [a third party] is the [c]hild's biological father".
61 Although see ibid. at para. 31.
62 Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process, 2nd ed. (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2003)
251.
63 James Fitzjames Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872): With an Introduction on the Principles
of Judicial Evidence (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1872) 132 (emphasis added).
6 Ibid.
65 Cap. 185, 2008 Rev. Ed. Sing.
6 [2008] 1 S.L.R. 1 (C.A.) [Tan Kiam Peng].
67 Ibid. at para. 75 (emphasis added).
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EA is one such 'conclusive presumption', but its inherent problems no doubt give
rise to a keenly felt need to ignore it when possible.
2. Can the parties agree to ignore a presumption of law?
If the courts cannot ignore a presumption of law, it must follow that parties cannot
agree between themselves to do the same. Parties may agree to waive some procedural
requirements, but they cannot do the same for an evidential requirement. This is
because rules of evidence have a direct effect on the court's substantive decision-
making process, whereas procedural rules exist mainly to aid the parties. 68
B. Staying True to Legislative Intent
The second ripple from WX is arguably more significant. It concerns how the courts
interpret statutes and whether it is permissible for them to effectively 'update' a
statute that has not been legislatively updated to keep up with modem progress.
1. The principles of statutory interpretation in Singapore
The relevant principles of statutory interpretation in Singapore have been reaf-
firmed by the Court of Appeal in AAG 69 and so only a brief summary is necessary
for present purposes. The dominant interpretive approach used by the Singapore
courts is the purposive approach as mandated by section 9A(1) of the Interpreta-
tion Act.70 Indeed, in the High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok
Heng,7 1 V.K. Rajah J.A. stated that any discussion on the construction of statutes
in Singapore takes place against the backdrop of that section.72 More specifically,
Rajah J.A. in Low Kok Heng also thought that statutory provisions should not, in
the name of applying the purposive approach, be interpreted in a manner that goes
against all possible and reasonable interpretations of the express actual wording of
the provision.7 3 In essence, the court is bound by the text as enacted.74 Perhaps the
best support for Rajah J.A.'s views was stated by Andrew Phang J. (as he then was)
in Nation Fittings (M) Sdn Bhd v. Oystertec plc,75 in which the learned judge said
68 "The Law of Evidence occupies a unique position in the field of substantive and procedural laws":
Ranchhoddas & Thakore, supra note 38 at "Preface".
69 AAG, supra note 2 at para. 7. See also Goh Yihan, "Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on
from Legislative Reform" (2009) 21 Sing. Ac. L.J. 97 at paras. 11-27 and Goh Yihan, "A Comparative
Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore" (2008) 29 Stat. L. Rev. 195 for a comparison between
the Singapore and Australian provisions regarding statutory interpretation.
70 Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing. [Interpretation Act].
71 [2007] 4 S.L.R. 183 (H.C.) [Low Kok Heng].
72 Ibid. at para. 39.
73 Ibid. at para. 52. See also Tan Un Tian v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 S.L.R. 33 (H.C.) at para. 45 and
Comfort Management Pte Ltd v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 S.L.R. 67 (H.C.) at para. 18, in which the
High Court stated that if the statutory word is capable of one meaning, the courts should not give it an
alternative meaning, for to do so would be to perform a legislative function: "A line must still be drawn
between purposive interpretation and law-making."
74 Ibid. at para. 53.
75 [2006] 1 S.L.R. 712 (H.C.).
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that the court's purposive interpretation should be "consistent with, and should not
either add to or take away from, or stretch unreasonably, the literal language of the
statutory provision concerned". 76 In other words, the language is the framework,
within which the legislative purpose must expressly or implicitly manifest, failing
which the latter cannot be given effect to. 77
2. How far can courts adopt an 'updating interpretation'to statutes?78
How then should courts interpret a statute which is 'outdated'?79 The Court of
Appeal in AAG stated that "[iut is a settled principle that a statutory provision should
be construed in a manner which will take into account new situations which may
arise and which were not within contemplation at the time of its enactment".8 0 The
question is how far this statement takes us. The key to resolving this issue is to be
clear of the purpose behind section 9A of the Interpretation Act. As the name of this
Act suggests, section 9A involves the judicial interpretation of a given statutory pro-
vision. This is important for, as Aharon Barak puts it,81 there is a difference between
interpretive and non-interpretive doctrines. 82 Barak states that the authority to alter
a text is one which belongs to its author, i.e., Parliament, but not to the judiciary. The
act of interpretation is the giving of a legal text a meaning its language (explicitly
or implicitly) can bear and does not involve the express rewriting of the language. 83
Interpretation ends at the point at which language ends.84 The constitutional frame-
work and the separation of powers restrict interpreters from stretching the meaning of
statutory provisions. 85 While there is a legislative mandate to interpret the statutory
provision in light of the legislative purpose, section 9A(1) also enjoins the court to
interpret the written law (or a provision thereof). This implies the boundaries of the
76 Ibid. at para. 27. Andrew Phang J.A. repeated these views in Tan Kiam Peng, supra note 66 at para. 59.
7 But cf Constitutional Reference No I of 1995 [1995] 2 S.L.R. 201 at 205 (C.T.). See further Goh Yihan,
"Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative Reform" (2009) 21 Sing. Ac. L.J. 97
at paras. 13-14.
78 See Gob Yihan, ibid. at paras. 28-31.
7 The issue of when a statute is 'outdated' obviously poses additional difficulties.
8o AAG, supra note 2 at para. 30.
81 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
82 Ibid. at 14-15.
83 Ibid. at 18.
' Ibid. at 15.
85 Ibid. at 20. This was also alluded to by Rajah J.A. in Low Kok Heng when he said (at para. 52):
Courts must be cautious to observe the limitations on their power and to confine themselves to
administering the law. "Purposive construction often requires a sophisticated analysis to determine
the legislative purpose and a discriminating judgment as to where the boundary of construction ends
and legislation begins" (per McHugh J.A. in Kingston v. Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 N.S.W.L.R. 404 at
423). Section 9A of the Interpretation Act should not be viewed as a means or licence by which judges
adopt new roles as legislators; the separation of powers between the judicial branch and the legislative
branch of government must be respected and preserved.
See also Justice E.W. Thomas, "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or
Two for the New Millennium" (2000) 31 V.U.W.L.R. 5.
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statutory language. The Court of Appeal in AAG was well aware of these limitations
when it said:86
If the correct interpretation of the [IFPA], as at the time of its enactment, was
that it could not be invoked by an illegitimate child, then it is not for the courts
to extend its scope by judicial interpretation. However, if, due to changing social
mores, it is thought that the Act should now be made available to an illegitimate
child, then that would be a matter within the province of Parliament to take the
appropriate measure to amend the law.
While language is open to varying degrees of interpretation,87 this does not mean
that it is infinitely malleable and can take on any meaning.88
Fortunately, as was earlier mentioned, the cases of WX and AAG do not raise the
problem of a court deviating from the legislative intent behind a statute. The courts in
both cases were well aware of the principles of statutory interpretation outlined above
and applied the legislative intent. The only question is what the relevant legislative
intent was, and to what extent the court can take into account any 'updates' to the
original legislative intent. In this respect, an 'updating interpretation' is probably
permissible if the updating is simply to include within a wide category (for example,
a manner of communication) specific modes which were not in existence at the
time the legislation was introduced. 89 This much was acknowledged by the Court of
Appeal in AAG. 90 The language is not stretched because the concern was with the
broader category generally, not modes of it specifically. But it is a different thing if
the 'updating' gives rise to the impression of rewriting the legislation.9 1
86 AAG, supra note 2 at para. 31.
87 Barak, supra note 81 at 23-24.
8 Ibid. Relevantly, in Lee Chez Kee v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 S.L.R. 447 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal
endorsed (at para. 116) what was said in Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2
S.L.R. 239 (H.C.) that "the 'facititative' characterisation of the EA could not extend the ambit of the EA
to cover common law developments which were inconsistent with it".
89 For example in SM Integrated Transware Pte Ltd v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2005] 2 S.L.R. 651
(H.C.) at para. 78. See also Francis A.R. Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th ed. (United
Kingdom: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) [Bennion] 889:
An updating construction of an enactment may be defined as a construction which takes account of
relevant changes which have occurred since the enactment was originally framed but does not alter
the meaning of its wording in ways which do not fall within the principles originally envisaged by that
wording" (emphasis added).
Indeed, even though the learned author states that considerations of developments in technology can be
used by the courts to modify the statutory language (a proposition not entirely universally accepted: see
generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998)), he does qualify this statement by saying that "[i]f however changed technology
produces something which is altogether beyond the scope of the original enactment, the court will not
treat it as covered" (Bennion at 905).
9 AAG, supra note 2 at para. 30.
91 Applied to WX, scientific truth may not be legal truth. There are examples of scientific developments not
adopted into the law by Parliament (where statutes are concerned) or the Judiciary, such as lie detection
tests. Parliament has arguably also seen it fit not to reopen criminal cases validly decided by the courts
notwithstanding DNA evidence showing the innocence of the convicted. In law, the convicted remains
guilty notwithstanding the scientific exoneration. This is another example of scientific truth not being
equated with legal truth: see Goh Yihan, "The Jurisdiction of the Singapore Court of Appeal to Reopen
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VI. CONCLUSION
The approach in WX was undoubtedly motivated by a keen sense to do justice in an
instant case. The result reached is one which the reasonable person would find difficult
to disagree with. However, it may be necessary to consider the wider implications
of the approach taken in that case. It is readily acknowledged that WX was not an
easy case to decide. There was understandably a desire to reach an outcome that
was 'substantively just'. But perhaps the concept of justice extends beyond the case
at hand.9 2 All things considered, legislative reform of section 114 of the EA-the
source of all the trouble-is the best way to minimise the trouble here.93 But for now,
when faced with an outdated statutory provision, the Court of Appeal's approach in
AAG, while reaching a 'regretful' result, is the preferable one to take.
Criminal Cases" (2008) Sing. J.L.S. 395. See also Tan Cheng Han, "The Legal Implications of Artificial
Insemination by Donor" (1991) Sing. J.L.S. 466 at 468-469.
92 The point is made forcefully by Andrew Phang J. (as he then was) in Hong Guet Eng v. Wu Wai Hong
(liquidator ofXiang Man Lou Food Court Pte Ltd) [2006] 2 S.L.R. 458 (H.C.) [Hong Guet Eng], when
he said (at paras. 47-48):
Justice is-and ought to be-administered in accordance with the prevailing law. There may be some
scope for manoeuvre if the prevailing law is unclear or ambiguous, and might result in substantive
injustice. But there are limits to such flexibility. Where, as in the present proceedings, the law is clear,
the court has no choice but to apply it.
If to achieve justice in a given case would open the floodgates to chaos and (ironically) consequent
injustice in other cases, the path the court must take is clear. In any event, as I have already pointed
out, this is by no means a clear-cut instance of a hard case. In other words, it is by no means clear that
injustice would clearly have resulted to the plaintiff in the instant proceedings.
See also United Overseas Bank Ltd v. Ng Huat Foundations Pte Ltd [2005] 2 S.L.R. 425 (H.C.) at para. 8
(emphasis in original).
93 In this respect, Professor Leong Wai Kum has suggested some possible improvements to the section and
it suffices to refer to her related writings. See Leong Wai Kum, "Legal Implications of Paternity Testing"
in Terry Kaan & Edison T. Liu, eds., Life Sciences: Law and Ethics-Recent Developments in Singapore
(Singapore: Singapore Academy of Law and Bioethics Advisory Committee, 2006) 169-170. See also
generally Kenneth Wee K.S., "The Law of Legitimacy in Singapore" (1976) 18 Mal. L. Rev. 1. Indeed,
the local courts have not been shy to suggest legislative reform when the occasion calls for it: see, for
example, Hong Guet Eng, ibid. at paras. 29-36 and 49.
